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Abstract
The fiscal theory of the price level says that the price level can
be made determinate if the government uses fiscal policies such that
government liabilities explode unless the price in the first period is at
the “right” level. The policy implications are disturbing, as they call
for rather adventurous fiscal policies. We show that these disturbing
policy implications are specific to the “Ricardian” models that have
been used to develop the theory. By moving to non Ricardian mod-
els we see that price determinacy is consistent with reasonable fiscal
policies.
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1 Introduction
In the recent years an intriguing theory of price determinacy in monetary
economies has developed, the fiscal theory of the price level1(FTPL). In a
monetary economy, depending on fiscal and monetary policies, dynamic tra-
jectories may have determinate prices, indeterminate prices, or no equilib-
rium. A wellknown result by Sargent and Wallace (1975) says that if the
nominal interest rate is pegged, there is nominal indeterminacy2. Now con-
sidering more general interest rate rules reacting to inflation, there will be
indeterminacy if the rule does not satisfy the wellknown “Taylor principle”3.
What the FTPL says is that, even in such circumstances, adequate fiscal
policies can restore determinacy. The fiscal policies that achieve determi-
nacy are such that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is not
balanced in all circumstances. In fact the intuition behind the result is that
under such policies the government’s real liabilities will evolve explosively in
time unless one starts from a particular price level. This makes this initial
price level the only feasible one. The problem with the FTPL is that the cor-
responding fiscal policies are rather risky, since the government does not plan
to balance its budget in all situations, and this could lead in most circum-
stances to explosive real liabilities. These controversial policy implications
have led to numerous contributions making explicitations or criticisms4.
What we want to show in this article is that the controversial policy im-
plications are actually due to the particular “Ricardian” framework whithin
which the results were derived, and we will show that moving to a “non-
Ricardian” framework yields much less controversial results. By non-Ricardian
models we mean models where, as in OLG models, new agents enter in time,
so that in particular Ricardian equivalence fails (Barro, 1974). We shall see
that in such a framework price determinacy is consistent with much more
reasonable fiscal policies.
Before going to the analytics, we may give a brief intuition as to why one
may dispense with the explosive FTPL policies in a non Ricardian economy.
It was shown by Weil (1991) that, unlike in a Ricardian economy, financial
assets represent real wealth to alive agents in a non Ricardian economy5. As a
1See notably Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995).
2This means that, if a price sequence is an equilibrium one, any price sequence multiple
of this one is also an equilibrium sequence.
3The “Taylor principle” says that the nominal interest rate should respond to inflation
with an elasticity greater than one. As a consequence the real interest rate will respond
positively to inflation (Taylor, 1993, 1998).
4See, for example, Buiter (2002), Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), McCallum (2001).
An empirical evaluation of the theory can be found in Sala (2004).
5In a nutshell, the eonomic intuition is the following: if there is a single infinitely lived
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result dynamic equations (see for example equation 16 below) will include not
only prices (which are non predetermined), but also financial assets (which
are predetermined), and this link will help to make prices determined.
2 The model
We want to have a non Ricardian model that “nests” the traditional in-
finitely lived agent model, so we shall use a model due to Weil (1987, 1991),
and assume that new “generations” of households are born each period, but
nobody dies. Denote as Nt the number of households alive at time t. So
Nt −Nt−1 ≥ 0 households are born in period t. We will mainly work below
with a constant rate of growth of the population n ≥ 0, so thatNt = (1 + n)t.
The Ricardian case is obtained by taking the limit case n = 0.
Consider a household born in period j. We denote by cjt, yjt and mjt his
consumption, endowment and money holdings at time t ≥ j. This household
maximizes the following utility function:
Ujt =
∞X
s=t
βs−tLog cjs (1)
and is submitted in period t to a “cash in advance” constraint:
Ptcjt ≤ mjt (2)
Household j begins period t with a financial wealth ωjt. First the bond
market opens, and the household lends an amount bjt at the nominal interest
rate it. The rest is kept under the form of money mjt, so that:
ωjt = mjt + bjt (3)
Then the goods market opens, and the household sells his endowment yjt,
pays taxes τ jt in real terms and consumes cjt, subject to the cash constraint
(2). Consequently, the budget constraint for household j is:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt − itmjt + Ptyjt − Ptτ jt − Ptcjt (4)
consumer, because of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, every dollar of
financial assets is cancelled by future discounted taxes, so that these assets represent no
net wealth. In the contrary in a non Ricardian economy agents not yet alive today will
pay part of these taxes in the future, so that a fraction of financial assets is real wealth
for currently alive agents.
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Aggregate quantities are obtained by summing the various individual vari-
ables. There are Nj −Nj−1 agents in generation j, so for example aggregate
assets Ωt and taxes Tt are equal to:
Ωt =
X
j≤t
(Nj −Nj−1)ωjt Tt =
X
j≤t
(Nj −Nj−1) τ jt (5)
Similar formulas apply to output Yt, consumption Ct, money Mt and
bonds Bt. We now must describe how endowments and taxes are distributed
among households. We assume that all households have the same income
and taxes, so:
yjt = yt = Yt/Nt τ jt = τ t = Tt/Nt (6)
and that real income per head grows at the rate ζ:
yt+1/yt = ζ Yt+1/Yt = (1 + n) ζ (7)
Let us now consider government. Households’ aggregate financial wealth
Ωt has as a counterpart an identical amount Ωt of financial liabilities of the
government. These are decomposed into money and bonds:
Ωt =Mt +Bt (8)
The evolution of these liabilities is described by the government’s budget
constraint:
Ωt+1 = (1 + it)Ωt − itMt − PtTt (9)
Note that, to simplify the exposition and to concentrate on tax policy, we
have assumed that governement spending is zero. If not, the results would
be essentially the same, but the formulas would be more clumsy.
2.1 Monetary policy
In what follows we shall study two types of monetary policies. First, and
since we want to concentrate on the eﬀects of fiscal policy, we shall study in
sections 4 and 5 a particularly simple monetary policy, interest rate pegging.
To simplify the exposition, we shall assume that the pegged interest rate
is constant in time, so that it = i0. As we indicated above this rule is of
particular interest because, in the usual Ricardian framework, it leads to
nominal indeterminacy.
We shall then also study in section 6 more general policies where the
nominal interest rate responds to inflation, i.e. denoting Πt = Pt/Pt−1:
4
1 + it = Φ (Πt) Φ (Πt) ≥ 1 Φ0 (Πt) ≥ 0 (10)
2.2 Fiscal policy
If the budget was balanced, taxes would be equal to interest payments on
bonds itBt, so that one would have PtTt = itBt. We shall actually assume
that the government can run a deficit or a surplus, so taxes have the form:
PtTt = itBt −D (Ωt, PtYt) (11)
where the function D (Ωt, PtYt), which represents the fiscal deficit in nominal
terms, is homogeneous of degree 1 in its two arguments6.
3 Dynamics
Let us start with the dynamic equation for Ωt. Putting together equations
(8), (9) and (11), we find:
Ωt+1 = Ωt +D (Ωt, PtYt) (12)
In view of the homogeneity property of the function D, it will be conve-
nient to take as a working variable:
Zt = Ωt/PtYt (13)
Then equation (12) can be rewritten:
Ωt+1/Ωt = F (Zt) (14)
where:
F (Zt) =
Ωt +D (Ωt, PtYt)
Ωt
(15)
Turning now to nominal income PtYt, it is shown in the appendix that,
assuming Nt+1/Nt = 1 + n, its dynamics is given by:
Pt+1Yt+1 = β (1 + n) (1 + it)PtYt − (1− β)nΩt+1 (16)
6Note that we express taxes as a function of PtYt and Ωt. Some authors use instead
as arguments PtYt and Bt. Since Ωt = Mt + Bt = PtYt + Bt, it is easy to go from one
formulation to the other, and all subsequent formulas can be rewritten with Bt as an
argument, but the results are sometimes more clumsy.
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Equations (14) and (16) are the basic dynamic equations of our model.
We should note that whereas in the traditional “Ricardian” case (n = 0)
equation (16) is homogeneous in prices only, if n > 0 the equation is homoge-
neous in prices and financial wealth. Since financial wealth is predetermined,
this gives a “nominal anchor” that will contribute, together with further con-
ditions that we will see below, to make prices determined.
Now, in order to contrast the results with what will follow, we shall
examine some determinacy conditions in the traditional Ricardian case.
4 The Ricardian case and the fiscal theory of
the price level
We shall begin our investigation with the traditional Ricardian version of the
model7. For that it is enough to take n = 0. We shall also assume a simple
interest rate peg it = i0, as this is a case where the fiscal theory of the price
level is particularly relevant. Equation (16) is then rewritten as:
Pt+1Yt+1 = β (1 + i0)PtYt (17)
Combining (13), (14) and (17) we find the dynamics of Zt:
Zt+1 =
ZtF (Zt)
β (1 + i0)
(18)
We shall denote as ξ the potential steady states (in Zt) of this system. In
view of (18), potential values of ξ are characterized by:
ξ = ξF (ξ) /β (1 + i0) (19)
4.1 Determinacy and the FTPL
We are mostly interested in equilibria with nonzero financial assets. We shall
assume that (19) admits at least one positive solution, and loglinearize (18)
around it. Omitting constants we find8:
zt+1 = (1 + f) zt (20)
where f is the elasticity of the “fiscal” function F :
7Determinacy conditions in the Ricardian case were notably developed by Leeper
(1991).
8Lowercase letters correspond to the logarithms of the corresponding uppercase letters.
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f = f (Zt) = ∂Log [F (Zt)] /∂LogZt (21)
Using the Blanchard Kahn (1980) criterion, the condition for local deter-
minacy is thus9:
f > 0 (22)
This means that, if the ratio Zt of government liabilities to nominal in-
come is already high, the government must increase the rate of growth of
these liabilities. Such a strategy will lead to an explosive behavior of finan-
cial liabilities, which is actually the basis of the fiscal theory of the price
level. It is also a rather adventurous fiscal policy, which contributed making
the FTPL controversial.
4.2 An example
Let us consider the following tax function:
PtTt = itBt + (1− γ)Ωt + δPtYt γ ≥ 0 δ ≥ 0 (23)
The term δPtYt says that the government taxes a constant fraction δ of
nominal income PtYt. The term (1− γ)Ωt says that the government may
want to withdraw a fraction 1 − γ of its outstanding financial liabilities. If
γ is greater than 1, this actually corresponds to an expansion of government
liabilities.
Combining (13), (17) and (23), we obtain the dynamics of Zt:
Zt+1 =
γZt − δ
β (1 + i0)
(24)
There will exist a determinate equilibrium only if:
γ > β (1 + i0) (25)
We see that the government should engineer a minimal rate of expansion
of its financial liabilities. Actually, if γ satisfies (25), then from (24) the ratio
of financial liabilities to income will be explosive. This is obviously a very
risky fiscal policy.
We may note that conditions (22) and (25) actually say the same thing.
Computing indeed the elasticity f at the equilibrium we find:
9The reader can actually check that this condition does not only hold for an interest
rate peg, but with a general interest rate rule Φ (Πt) as well, as long as it does not satisfy
the Taylor principle.
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f =
γ − β (1 + i0)
β (1 + i0)
(26)
so that f > 0 (equation 22) yields γ > β (1 + i0) (equation 25).
5 Fiscal policy and determinacy in the non-
Ricardian case
We want to show now that, as soon as one moves to a non-Ricardian frame-
work, adventurous fiscal policies like (22) or (25) are not necessary anymore
for determinacy. We shall begin in this section with local determinacy, leav-
ing global determinacy to the next section.
5.1 The dynamic equations
We shall now study the dynamics of the system in the non Ricardian case,
i.e. n > 0. To compare it with the results of section 4 we continue to assume
interest rate pegging it = i0, so equation (14) still holds and (16) is written:
Pt+1Yt+1 = θPtYt − κΩt+1 (27)
with:
θ = β (1 + n) (1 + i0) κ = (1− β)n (28)
Dividing (14) by (27) we obtain the dynamics of Zt:
Zt+1 =
ZtF (Zt)
θ − κZtF (Zt)
(29)
From now on we shall assume that government liabilities can become
neither negative nor infinite, so that: 0 ≤ F (Zt) ≤ Fmax <∞. The potential
steady states ξ are given by: ξ = ξF (ξ) / [θ − κξF (ξ)]. There are two types
of solutions, ξ1 and ξ2, given by (when they exist):
F (ξ1) =
θ
1 + κξ1
ξ2 = 0 (30)
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5.2 Determinacy
Now loglinearizing equation (29) around the positive solution ξ1 we find:
zt+1 =
θ
F (ξ1)
(1 + f) zt (31)
and the condition for local determinacy is:
θ (1 + f) > F (ξ1) (32)
We see that f > 0 (equation 22) is not necessary anymore for determinacy.
5.3 An example
Assume that the government engineers through fiscal policy a constant rate
of growth γ of its liabilities, so that F (Zt) = γ and f = 0. Then the
determinacy condition (32) becomes:
γ < θ = β (1 + n) (1 + i0) (33)
We see that the policy prescription is practically the inverse of that in
condition (25)! Here a more rigorous fiscal policy (i.e. a low γ) is conducive to
price determinacy, unlike in the FTPL where a very unrigorous fiscal policy
(a high γ) was the key to determinacy (condition 25).
To interpret further (33), let us rewrite it as:
ζ (1 + n) (1 + i0)
γ
>
ζ
β
(34)
Since inflation is equal to γ/ζ (1 + n), this says that the real rate of return
of the financial assets (left hand side) is greater than the rate of return in
the Ricardian model ζ/β. Such a condition was shown in Wallace (1980) and
Bénassy (2002) to be a condition for the viability of a monetary equilibrium.
5.4 A global view
Let us continue with the example above, and consider now the issue of global
determinacy. With F (Zt) = γ, the dynamic equation (29) becomes:
Zt+1 =
γZt
θ − κγZt
(35)
This is represented in figure 1. We see that the equilibrium ξ1 is indeed
locally determinate. But there is a second equilibrium ξ2 = 0 which is inde-
terminate, and all trajectories initiating between ξ1 and ξ2 converge towards
9
it. So it is important to move to the study of global determinacy, and we
shall now show how adequate combinations of monetary and fiscal policies
allow to obtain global determinacy.
Figure 1: Local determinacy, global indeterminacy
6 Global determinacy
We shall now introduce interest rate rules that respond to inflation like (10)
and show that we can achieve global determinacy under reasonable fiscal
policies.
Let us recall that in the Ricardian framework there are two alternative
conditions for price determinacy, corresponding to the Taylor principle and
the FTPL, and expressed respectively as φ (Πt) > 1 and f (Zt) > 0. What
we want to show is that in a non-Ricardian world it is possible to obtain
global determinacy eventhough none of these two conditions is satisfied, i.e.
if we have both:
φ (Πt) < 1 and f (Zt) ≤ 0 (36)
Policies like (36) would lead to indeterminacy in the Ricardian frame-
work10. Combining (10), (14) and (16), the dynamic equation for nominal
income is written:
Pt+1Yt+1 = β (1 + n)Φ (Πt)PtYt − κΩt+1 (37)
The dynamic system consists of equations (14) and (37). Because of the
more general interest rate rule Φ (Πt), it will not be possible to summarize
the dynamics with one single variable as in (29), so we shall use two working
variables11, inflation Πt and the (predetermined) variable Xt = Ωt/Pt−1Yt−1.
Then, calling ν = κ/ (1 + n) = n (1− β) / (1 + n), the dynamic system (14),
(37) is rewritten:
Xt+1 =
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(38)
ζΠt+1 = βΦ (Πt)− νXt+1 (39)
10Conditions for global determinacy in traditional Ricardian economies have been no-
tably studied in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001, 2002).
11This representation is borrowed from Guillard (2004).
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6.1 A general interest rate rule
We shall first study here the case with a general interest rate rule Φ (Πt),
but, in order to make the exposition more transparent, continue with the
fiscal example of section 5.3, i.e. F (Zt) = γ, so that (38) is rewritten as:
Xt+1 =
γXt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
(40)
6.1.1 Uniqueness of equilibrium
As a first step we shall look for conditions that yield a unique equilibrium.
From (39) and (40) the potential steady states (X∗,Π∗) are characterized by
the two equations:
X∗ = γX∗/ζ (1 + n)Π∗ (41)
ζΠ∗ = βΦ (Π∗)− νX∗ (42)
This yields two types of potential steady states:
Π∗ = γ
ζ (1 + n)
X∗ =
βΦ (Π∗)− ζΠ∗
ν
(43)
X∗ = 0 ζΠ∗ = βΦ (Π∗) (44)
The first solution, described by (43), always exists. So the only way to
have a unique equilibrium is to suppress the solutions described by (44). It
is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for that is:
βΦ (Πt)− ζΠt > 0 ∀Πt (45)
We may note that (45) can be rewritten as:
Φ (Πt) /Πt > ζ/β (46)
In words, the interest rate rule should generate a real rate of interest that
is higher than the real rate that would prevail in the corresponding Ricardian
economy. We should note the conceptual similarity of (46) with equation
(34), as both express that the real return on financial assets is suﬃciently
high to induce agents to hold them in long run equilibrium.
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6.1.2 Global determinacy
The equations of the curves Xt+1 = Xt and Πt+1 = Πt are respectively:
Xt = 0 and Πt = γ/ζ (1 + n) (47)
Xt = ζ (1 + n)Πt [βΦ (Πt)− ζΠt] /γν (48)
We may further note that:
Xt+1 > Xt if Πt < γ/ζ (1 + n) (49)
Πt+1 > Πt if Xt < ζ (1 + n)Πt [βΦ (Πt)− ζΠt] /γν (50)
Figure 2 depicts the two curves Πt+1 = Πt and Xt+1 = Xt, as well as the
dynamics of the economy given by (49) and (50), in the case corresponding
to condition (46). It appears clearly that the dynamics around the unique
equilibrium is a saddle path, and there is global determinacy.
There remains now to check that there exist functions Φ (Πt) such that the
Taylor principle does not hold, and nevertheless condition (45) is satisfied.
Figure 2: F (Zt) = γ and a general interest rate rule Φ (Πt)
6.2 An example: linear interest rate rules
We shall consider here simple linear interest rate rules:
Φ (Πt) = AΠt +B A > 0 B > 1 (51)
They have the property that their elasticity is always below 1 since:
φ (Πt) =
∂LogΦ (Πt)
∂LogΠt
=
∂Log (AΠt +B)
∂LogΠt
=
AΠt
AΠt +B
< 1 (52)
so they do not satisfy the Taylor principle. Now condition (45) will be sat-
isfied if A > ζ/β, and then global determinacy is ensured.
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6.3 A general fiscal rule
The above global determinacy result has been obtained with the particular
fiscal rule F (Zt) = γ. We want to show now that global determinacy can
actually be obtained with quite more general fiscal rules F (Zt). In order to
keep calculations simple, we shall use for monetary policy the simple linear
interest rate rule seen in the preceding section, i.e.:
Φ (Πt) = AΠt +B A ≥ ζ/β (53)
As we indicated at the beginning of section 6, we are interested in “rea-
sonable”, non explosive fiscal rules such that f (Zt) ≤ 0. We shall actually
now prove that a suﬃcient condition for global determinacy is, together with
(53):
−1 < f (Zt) ≤ 0 (54)
Let us prove indeed that (53) and (54) are suﬃcient for global determi-
nacy. The equations of the curves Xt+1 = Xt and Πt+1 = Πt are respectively:
ζ (1 + n)Πt = F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(55)
(βA− ζ)Πt +B =
νXt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(56)
Assumption (54) implies that, in the (Πt,Xt) plane, the locus Xt+1 = Xt
is downward sloping, whereas assumptions (53) and (54) imply that the locus
Πt+1 = Πt is upward sloping. The dynamics is represented in figure 3, where
it appears that we have saddle path dynamics and global determinacy.
Figure 3: Φ (Πt) = AΠt +B and a general fiscal rule F (Zt)
7 Conclusion
We have seen that in the Ricardian case price determinacy is obtained if the
fiscal authority expands government liabilities suﬃciently for these liabilities
to become explosive (see for example conditions 22 and 25), which is a central
mechanism behind the fiscal theory of the price level.
This controversial prescription is not necessary anymore in a non-Ricardian
framework. We found indeed that in such a case an explosive expansion of
government liabilities is not required for local or global price determinacy,
13
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and that price determinacy can be associated to reasonable fiscal prescrip-
tions (see for example condition 33). Finally we saw that global determinacy
could be achieved with a combination of monetary and fiscal policies where
monetary policy does not satisfy the “Taylor principle” and fiscal policies are
nevertheless reasonable.
We saw the basic intuitions along the way and we can summarize them
briefly: (1) The non Ricardian framework creates a wealth eﬀect through
which prices are linked to financial wealth, a predetermined variable (see
notably equation 16). (2) In addition to n > 0, the determinacy conditions
(equations 34 or 46) simply say that the combination of monetary and fiscal
policies must make financial assets attractive enough (in rate of return) to
be actually held by households. These conditions have nothing to do with
the “explosive” FTPL policies like (22) or (25).
So it appears that the controversial policy prescriptions associated with
the FTPL are linked with the Ricardian character of the economies in which
they were derived. They disappear when one moves to a (more realistic)
non-Ricardian framework.
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Appendix
In this appendix we shall derive the fundamental dynamic equation (16).
Consider the household’s budget equation (4), and assume that it is strictly
positive. The household will thus satisfy the “cash in advance” equation
exactly, so that mjt = Ptcjt and the budget constraint is written:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt + Ptyt − Ptτ t − (1 + it)Ptcjt (57)
Let us define the following discount factors:
Rt =
1
(1 + i0) . . . (1 + it−1)
R0 = 1 (58)
Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the sequence of budget
constraints (57) from time t to infinity yields household j’s consumption
function:
RtPtcjt = (1− β)
"
Rtωjt +
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(59)
Summing this across the Nt agents alive in period t, and using the equi-
librium condition Ct = Yt we obtain the equilibrium equation:
RtPtYt = RtPtCt = (1− β)
"
RtΩt +Nt
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(60)
Let us divide both sides by Nt, subtract from it the corresponding equa-
tion for t+ 1, and then divide by Rt+1. We obtain:
(1 + it)Ptyt − Pt+1yt+1 = (1− β)
·
(1 + it)Ωt
Nt
− Ωt+1
Nt+1
+ Pt (yt − τ t)
¸
(61)
Divide the government’s budget equation (9) by Nt and insert it into (61).
This yields:
Pt+1yt+1 = β (1 + it)Ptyt − (1− β)
µ
1
Nt
− 1
Nt+1
¶
Ωt+1 (62)
Now multiply (62) by Nt+1, and assume Nt+1/Nt = 1 + n. We obtain
equation (16).
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